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LIFE AFTER DOMA: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Professor Allison I. Connelly & Julie Butcher 
 
 
 
We made a commitment to each other in our love and lives, and now had the legal 
commitment, called marriage, to match. Isn't that what marriage is? ... I have lived long 
enough now to see big changes. The older generation's fears and prejudices have given 
way, and today's young people realize that if someone loves someone they have a right 
to marry... I believe all Americans, no matter their race, no matter their sex, no matter 
their sexual orientation, should have that same freedom to marry. Government has no 
business imposing some people's religious beliefs over others... I support the freedom to 
marry for all. That's what Loving, and loving, are all about.  
 
Mildred Loving, Loving for All, Public Statement on the 
40th Anniversary of Loving v. Virginia (June 12, 2007), 
cited in Bostic v. Rainey, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va., Feb. 
14, 2014). 
 
 
I. THE FAULT LINES:  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
A. Article IV, Section 1:  "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which 
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof." 
 
B. Fifth Amendment:  "No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law ..." 
 
C. Fourteenth Amendment... "No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." 
 
D. Kentucky Constitution, Section One: "All men are, by nature, free and 
equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may 
be reckoned ... The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and 
happiness..." 
 
E. Kentucky Constitution, Section Two:  "Absolute and arbitrary power over 
the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not 
even in the largest majority." 
 
F. Kentucky Constitution, Section Three:  "All men, when they form a social 
compact, are equal; and no grant of exclusive, separate public 
emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man or set of men ..." 
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G. Kentucky Constitution, Section 233A:  "Only a marriage between one man 
and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky.  
A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for 
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized."  
 
H. KRS 402.020(1)(d): "Marriage is prohibited and void: ... between mem-
bers of the same sex." 
 
II. TREMORS 
 
A. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)   
 
The Court struck two statutes criminalizing miscegenation under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection clauses.  Virginia was one of sixteen states 
at the time that prohibited and punished marriages on the basis of racial 
classifications. The lower court concluded that marriage had "traditionally 
been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, and, 
consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state 
control by the Tenth Amendment." The state gave up that argument 
before the Supreme Court and argued instead that Fourteenth 
Amendment didn't apply to its miscegenation laws. 
 
The Supreme Court found a due process violation holding, "The freedom 
to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."  The Court also 
held the statutes violated the equal protection clause holding, "There is 
patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial 
discrimination which justifies this classification.  . . There can be no doubt 
that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial 
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause." Id. at 11-12. 
 
B. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), holding that the 
Constitution does not protect "a fundamental right" "for same-sex couples 
to get married." Baker appealed and on October 10, 1972, the Supreme 
Court ordered, "Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn. Dismissed for want of a 
substantial federal question."  Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).  
Baker is precedent because Supreme Court review was mandatory.  
Therefore, the dismissal operated as a decision on the merits. 
 
C. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. App. 1973), holding there is no 
constitutional right to have a marriage license issued to two persons of 
the same sex because same sex couples are incapable of entering into a 
marriage as that term is defined by common usage. 
 
D. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), holding constitutional a 
Georgia statute criminalizing adult same sex consensual conduct 
because "none of the rights announced in [prior cases] bears any 
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage 
in acts of sodomy ... No connection between family, marriage, or 
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has 
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been demonstrated... Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and 
was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they ratified 
the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of 
the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, 
all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of 
Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in 
private and between consenting adults. Against this background, to claim 
that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at 
best, facetious."  Id. at 193-194. 
 
E. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992), holding 
unconstitutional a statute criminalizing consensual "homosexual sodomy" 
because it violates the right of privacy and equal protection under 
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution. 
 
F. 1993:  Hawaii Supreme Court rules that a ban on gay marriage violates 
the Hawaii Constitution, but five years later a constitutional amendment is 
passed defining marriage between one man and one woman. 
 
G. December 1993:  "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" implemented. 
 
H. 1995:  Utah passes the first "mini-DOMA" legislation prohibiting same sex 
marriage.  More than thirty other states will follow. 
 
I. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), a 6-3 Kennedy opinion, striking 
down, under the Equal Protection Clause, a Colorado constitutional 
amendment that prevented the state and any city, county or school district 
from providing "official protections" based on sexual orientation. 
 
J. 1996:  President Clinton signs the Defense of Marriage Act into law. The 
law defines marriage as a legal union between one man and one woman 
and that no state is required to recognize a same-sex marriage from out 
of state. 
 
K. April 26, 2000:  Vermont becomes the first state in the U.S. to legalize 
civil unions and registered partnerships between same-sex couples. 
 
L. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), a 6-3 Kennedy opinion over- 
ruling Bowers v. Hardwick,  and holding unconstitutional a Texas statute 
that criminalized consensual, adult homosexual intercourse as illegal 
sodomy under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. "The 
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."  Id. at 578. 
 
M. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), 
the first state court decision to find that same-sex couples had the right to 
marry because the prohibition denied "the dignity and equality of all 
individuals," making them "second class citizens." 
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N. November 2004: Kentucky passes Section 233A, a "mini-DOMA" 
constitutional amendment defining marriage as between one man and 
one woman. 
 
O. December 2010:  The repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell becomes law. 
 
P. June 2013:  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013) and U.S. v. 
Windsor, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) decided. 
 
Q. The Current Landscape as of April 1, 2014:   
 
1. Since Windsor, not a single state's same sex marriage ban has 
survived federal court challenge.  See, Human Rights Campaign, 
American for Marriage Equality, http://www.hrc.org/press-
releases, visited April 14, 2014.   
 
2. Marriage equality has been legalized in seventeen states:  
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Washington and the District of Columbia.  Thirty-seven percent of 
the country lives in a marriage equality state.  See, N. Flaherty, 
Marriage Equality USA, http://www.marriageequality.org/national-
map, visited April 10, 2014.  
 
Three states provide the equivalent of state level marriage rights 
to same sex couples:  Colorado, District of Columbia and Oregon. 
Id. 
 
3. Thirty-three states have same sex marriage bans through either 
legislation or constitutional amendments or both.   
 
a. Hawaii has an amendment that gives the legislature the 
authority to define marriage.  
  
b. Nine states have amendments that prohibit same sex 
marriage only: Alaska, Nevada, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Oregon, Colorado, Tennessee and Arizona.   
 
c. Eighteen states have amendments that prohibit same sex 
marriage and civil unions:  Nebraska, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, 
Kansas, Texas, Alabama, Idaho, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Wisconsin, Florida, and North Carolina.   
 
d. Two states prohibit same sex marriage, civil unions and 
other contracts:  Michigan and Virginia.  Id. 
 
4. Ten state constitutional amendments or statutes have been found 
unconstitutional or have been repealed by state supreme courts or 
4 
U.S. District Courts:  California, Nevada, Michigan, Oklahoma, 
Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Texas, and Utah. 
 
a. Seven state attorney generals from Kentucky, Nevada, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, California and Illinois, 
have refused to defend marriage bans on same sex 
marriages. 
 
b. Ohio, Tennessee and Kentucky's rulings are limited to the 
recognition of out of state same sex marriages. 
 
5. Same sex marriage court cases have been filed in at least "28 
states and Puerto Rico and account for 250 plaintiffs taking on 
state marriage bans."  Id. 
 
6. There are five federal circuit courts that will rule in nine same sex 
marriage cases in the coming months.  They are:  Fourth Circuit 
(Virginia), Fifth Circuit (Texas), Ninth Circuit (Nevada), Tenth 
Circuit (separate cases from Utah, Wyoming, Kansas, Colorado, 
and Oklahoma) and four cases from the Sixth Circuit (Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Michigan and Ohio.) The Sixth Circuit is the only federal 
appeals court so far to consider same sex marriage cases "from 
all states within its jurisdiction."  Id. 
 
7. Only five states, Alaska, Georgia, Montana, North Dakota and 
South Dakota, ban same sex marriage but have no current court 
cases challenging their constitutionality. See, Human Rights 
Campaign, Press Room, Cases, Coast to Coast, at 
http://www.hrc.org/press-releases, visited April 14, 2014.   
 
III. THE FIRST QUAKE:  PERRY  
 
A. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013)   
 
In Perry, the Court didn't reach the question whether California's 
Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by "defining marriage solely as the union of a man and a 
woman." 
 
In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Scalia, 
Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan, the Court held that the "proponents" of 
Proposition 8, five California residents, lacked standing to appeal the 
judgment of the U.S. District Court invalidating the state ballot initiative.  
 
"We have never before upheld the standing of a private party to defend 
the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not 
to.  We decline to do so for the first time here."  Id. at 2655. The Court 
found that the "proponents," who stepped in when the State refused to 
appeal the trial court's ruling, had only a "generalized" interest in 
upholding the validity of Prop. 8.  "Their only interest in having the District 
Court order reversed was to vindicate the constitutional validity of a 
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generally applicable California Law.  We have repeatedly held that such a 
generalized grievance, no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer 
standing." Id. at 2658.  In short, the proponents had no "concrete and 
particularized injury."  Id. 
 
B. Impact    
 
Same sex couples in California can now marry.  There is concern that the 
ruling will permit state officials "unchecked power to nullify ballot initiatives 
they dislike by refusing to enforce them or defend them in court." Valerie 
Richardson, "Critics Say Supreme Court's Prop 8 Ruling Takes Power 
from Voters, Gives It to State Officials," (June 30, 2013,)  
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/30/critics-say-supreme-
courts-proposition-8-ruling-ta/#ixzz2n0AOAapi  
 
IV. THE EARTHQUAKE:  A TALE OF TWO RATIONALES:  U.S. V. WINDSOR1 
 
A. Facts   
 
After living as a couple for nearly forty years, Edith Windsor and Thea 
Spyer, New York residents, got married in 2007 in Toronto, Canada, 
where same sex marriage was legal.  New York recognized the marriage 
because they had registered as domestic partners in 1993.  Spyer died in 
2009.  She left her entire estate to Windsor.  Windsor tried to claim the 
federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, but her claim was 
denied by the IRS. The IRS stated that "for federal tax purposes, a 
'marriage' means only a legal union between a man and a woman as 
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' means a person of the opposite 
sex who is a husband or a wife."  The regulations language was required 
under §3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738C, which defined 
"marriage" and "spouse" as legal unions between a man and a woman. 
  
Because of DOMA's definition of marriage, the federal government 
imposed a $363,053 tax on Spyer's estate.  If the U.S. government had 
recognized the marriage, the estate would have qualified for the spousal 
exemption and Windsor would not have had any tax liability. 
 
Windsor filed suit under the Fifth Amendment challenging the 
constitutionality of §3 of DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause.  She 
sought a refund of the federal estate tax.  The government defended 
DOMA at first, but changed its position and decided not to defend DOMA 
in court.  In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the 
House of Representatives voted to intervene in the lawsuit and to defend 
the constitutionality of §3. 
 
  
1 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) (5-4 Kennedy opinion joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor and Kagan with Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito dissenting). 
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B. Threshold Holding   
 
The Court had jurisdiction to hear the case because there was a sufficient 
controversy under Article III.  The refund the District Court ordered the 
government to pay, and which the U.S. had refused to pay, constituted a 
"real and immediate economic injury."  See, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490 (1975). Prudential considerations – "matters of judicial self-
governance" – were also met under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
BLAG's "substantial adversarial argument for Section 3's constitutionality 
satisfies prudential concerns that otherwise might counsel against hearing 
an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties agree."  Id. at 
2687-2688. 
 
C. Merits Holding  
 
1. "The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those 
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity.  By seeking to displace this protection 
and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected 
than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment."  Id. at 2696. 
 
2. In other words, the Court held that DOMA created a subset of 
state sanctioned marriages that were treated unequally to other 
state sanctioned marriages; and that the federal government 
cannot overturn a particular state's decision in defining marriage.  
As such, if a state decides to recognize same-sex marriages, 
federal law must respect that choice. 
 
3. "By history and tradition the definition and regulation of marriage 
... has been treated as being within the authority and realm of the 
separate States." Id. at 2690.  "The State's power in defining the 
martial relation is of central relevance in this case ... Here the 
State's decision to give this class of persons the right to marry 
conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import.  
When the State used its historic and essential authority to define 
the marital relation in this way, its role and its power in making the 
decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the 
class in their own community. DOMA because of its reach and 
extent, departs from this history and tradition of reliance on state 
law to define marriage." Id. at 2692. 
 
4. "DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect.  
By doing so it violates basic due process and equal protection 
principles applicable to the Federal Government … The Constitu-
tion's guarantee of equality 'must at the very least mean that a 
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot' justify disparate treatment of that group…" Id. at 2693.   
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5. "DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing 
and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to 
deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that 
come with the federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong 
evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of 
that class.  The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law 
here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, 
and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages 
made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States."  Id.   
 
6. DOMA's "demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State 
decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be 
treated as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law.  
This raises a most serious question under the Constitution's Fifth 
Amendment... DOMA's operation in practice confirms this purpose 
... DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code... 
DOMA's principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned 
marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to 
impose inequality ..."  Id. at  2693- 2694. 
 
D. Two Rationales Become One:  Federalism/State Sovereignty and Liberty 
 
1. One rationale is based on federalism.  The rationale is framed on 
the states' "historic and essential authority to define the martial 
relation."  Id. at 2692.  "The Court ruled that if a state exercises its 
sovereign power and recognizes same sex marriage, federal law 
"must respect that choice." The opinion notes that laws 
recognizing same sex marriage "eliminate inequality," but the 
choice to recognize the marriage is "within the realm and authority 
of the separate States."  Id.  Because DOMA's definition of 
marriage created "two contradictory marriage regimes with the 
same State," it was unconstitutional. Congress' definition of 
marriage in §3 "interfered" with "state sovereign choices" 
regarding marriage and relegated same sex marriages to "second 
tier" status. 
 
2. In novel reasoning, the opinion uses state law to recognize a 
protected right or liberty within its borders against a federal 
statute.  The Court notes that DOMA raised major concerns that it 
was the product of animus.  First, the legislative record is clear 
regarding Congress' view that same-sex marriage is immoral and 
"un-Christian."   
 
a. Second, "In determining whether a law is motivated by an 
improper animus or purpose, 'discriminations of an unusual 
character' especially require careful consideration.  DOMA 
cannot survive under these principles." Id. at 2693.  DOMA 
departs from tradition and doesn't let the states decide who 
is married.  This "is strong evidence of a law having the 
purpose and effect of disapproval of that class."  Id.   
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b. The Court concluded, "The avowed purpose and practical 
effect of the law here in question are to impose a 
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all 
who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
unquestioned authority of the States."  Id. 
 
c. The Court said, "The congressional goal was 'to put a 
thumb on the scales and influence a state's decision as to 
how to shape its own marriage laws.' The Act's 
demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State 
decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions 
will be treated as second-class marriages for purposes of 
federal law.  This raises a most serious question under the 
Constitution's Fifth Amendment."  Id. at 2693-94. 
 
d. "The power the Constitution grants it also restrains.  And 
though Congress has great authority to design laws to fit 
its own conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment."  Id. at 2695. 
 
e. "The principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law 
are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex 
marriage.  This requires the Court to hold, as it now does, 
that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the 
liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution."  Id. 
 
E. A Note on Dissents   
 
1. Scalia predicted that Kennedy's language that DOMA's "principal 
purpose is to impose inequality," "would show up in future suits 
challenging state laws and state constitutional amendments."  
He's right.  Seventy-five opinions have already cited Windsor. 
 
2. "We have no power to decide this case.  And even if we did, we 
have no power under the Constitution to invalidate this 
democratically adopted legislation. The Court's errors on both 
points spring forth from the same diseased root: an exalted 
conception of the role of this institution in America."  Id. at 2697-
2698. 
 
3. "In the majority's telling, this story is black-and-white: hate your 
neighbor or come along with us.  The truth is more complicated.  It 
is hard to admit that one's political opponents are not monsters, 
especially in a struggle like this one, and the challenge in the end 
proves more than today's Court can handle. Too bad."  Id. at 
2711. 
 
4. Roberts was more measured. He said he "would not tar the 
political branches with the brush of bigotry without more 
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convincing evidence that the Act's principal purpose was to codify 
malice."  Id. at 2696. 
 
F.   What Windsor Did Not Hold or Do 
 
1. It did not decide whether the Constitution guarantees the right to 
same-sex marriages or whether the Constitution forbids state 
bans on such marriages. "This opinion and its holding are 
confined to those lawful marriages," meaning those states that 
have recognized or may recognize in the future same sex-
marriages.  Id. at 2696. 
 
2. The opinion does not decide "whether the States in their 'historic 
and essential authority to define the martial relation may continue 
to utilize the traditional definition of marriage." Id. at 2696 (Roberts 
dissent). 
 
3. The opinion did not articulate a clear test or level of judicial review 
in judging LGBT or same-sex marriage cases. 
 
4. The opinion did not implicitly or explicitly discuss §2 of DOMA, 
which gives the states the right to refuse to recognize same-sex 
marriages performed in other states. 
 
5. The opinion did not reach couples who are barred from marrying 
in the thirty-three "mini-DOMA" states where same-sex marriage is 
prohibited. 
 
V. U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL AFTERSHOCKS   
 
A. Caveat:  This is only a brief sampling of cases after Windsor and does not 
include the many cases in the pipeline.  One headline appropriately said, 
"Weeks after Key Part of Federal Marriage Act is Struck Down, 
Preliminary Findings Show Decision Could Reshape Laws."  This section 
includes potential federal arguments that can be made.  However, don't 
forget §§§1, 2 and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution. 
 
B. Full Faith and Credit:  §2 of DOMA:  Are states constitutionally required to 
recognize same-sex marriages that were celebrated in states that 
sanction same-sex marriages? 
 
1. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 291 (1942) 
holds that the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit clause is "to 
alter the status of the several states as independent foreign 
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the 
laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make 
them integral parts of a single nation." 
 
2. Academics disagree on whether DOMA violates the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.   
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Many academics say §2 is constitutional under the second 
sentence of the clause; "And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." 
 
Since Congress has the right to control the "effect" of the Acts, 
Records and Proceedings, it is controlling the "effect" of same-sex 
marriage recognition through §2 of DOMA. 
 
3. Other academics argue that even though Congress has the 
authority to define the "effect" of the Acts, Congress does not have 
the authority to limit the scope of the Full Faith and Credit clause. 
 
C. Equal Protection & Due Process 
 
1. Love v. Beshear (formerly Bourke v. Beshear), No. 3:13-cv-750-H, 
2014 WL 556729, at 1 (W.D. Ky. February 12, 2014), appealed to 
the Sixth Circuit but holding "that Kentucky's denial of recognition 
for valid same-sex marriages violates the United States 
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law, even 
under the most deferential standard of review. Accordingly, 
Kentucky's statutes and constitutional amendment that mandate 
this denial are unconstitutional." 
 
2. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.Supp.2d 968, 978, 983 (S.D Ohio, 
2013), holding "where same-sex couples legally marry outside of 
Ohio and then reside in Ohio, a different right than the 
fundamental right to marry is also implicated: here, the 
constitutional due process right at issue is not the right to marry, 
but, instead, the right not to be deprived of one's already-existing 
legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections. In 
addition to concluding that Ohio's marriage recognition bans are 
an impermissible and unconstitutional burden on Plaintiffs' 
significant liberty interest in the continued existence and 
recognition of their marriages under the Due Process Clause, this 
Court further finds and declares that Plaintiffs have also 
demonstrated that Ohio's same-sex marriage recognition bans 
further violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by denying them 
equal protection of the laws. 
  
3. Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13–cv–501, 2013 WL 3814262 (S.D 
Ohio, Jul. 22, 2013), holding based on Windsor, that interstate 
recognition is required under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Court granted a temporary restraining 
order requiring Ohio to recognize a marriage between two Ohio 
men who married in Maryland. 
 
4. Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-cv-00129TSB, 2014 WL 1418395 (S.D. 
Ohio, Apr. 14, 2014), holding unconstitutional Ohio's "marriage 
amendment" because of Ohio's refusal to recognize out of state 
same sex marriages. "There can be no circumstance under which 
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this discriminatory classification is constitutional, as it was 
intended to, and on its face does stigmatize and disadvantage 
same sex couples and their families, denying only to them 
protected rights to recognition of their marriages and violating the 
guarantee of equal protection." 
 
5. Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F.Supp.2d 939 (E. Dist. Mich. 2013), 
holding that five Michigan state employee plaintiffs have a 
"likelihood of succeeding" on their claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause that the state must provide benefits to their 
same-sex partners.  
 
6. Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011), holding that LGBT 
state employees with committed same-sex life partners have a 
"likelihood of succeeding" on their claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause that Arizona's statute of limiting eligibility for 
family health care coverage to married heterosexual employees is 
unconstitutional. 
 
7. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F.Supp.2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013); appealed 
to Tenth Circuit and arguments were heard on April 10, 2014.  The 
court held that Utah's state constitutional ban on same sex 
marriage was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  "The State's 
current laws deny its gay and lesbian citizens their fundamental 
right to marry and, in doing so demean the dignity of these same 
sex couples for no rational reason." 
 
8. Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1282 (N.D. 
Okla. 2014); appealed to Tenth Circuit, but holding Oklahoma's 
state constitutional ban on same sex marriage unconstitutional 
based on Windsor, and under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ban served 
no rational purpose. The state's justifications, such as procreation, 
wasn't rationally related to a marriage ban for same sex couples.  
Moreover, the state's ban "intentionally discriminates against 
[same sex couples] – for two reasons. First, Part A's disparate 
impact upon same-sex couples desiring to marry is stark. Its effect 
is to prevent every same-sex couple in Oklahoma from receiving a 
marriage license, and no other couple. This is not a case where 
the law has a small or incidental effect on the defined class; it is a 
total exclusion of only one group." 
 
9. De Leon v. Perry, No. 5:13-cv-00982-OLG, 2014 WL 715741 
(W.D. Tex., Feb. 26, 2014); appealed to the Fifth Circuit.  De Leon 
holds Texas' state constitutional ban on same sex marriage 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses. "Texas' current marriage laws deny homosexual couples 
the right to marry, and in doing so, demean their dignity for no 
legitimate reason."  The ban couldn't survive under even the most 
deferential rational basis level of review.  Moreover, under Due 
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Process, "By denying plaintiff's the fundamental right to marry, 
Texas denies their relationship the same status and dignity 
afforded to citizens who are permitted to marry.  It also denies 
them the legal, social and financial benefits of marriage that 
opposite sex couples enjoy." 
 
10. Bostic v. Rainey, (formerly Bostic v. McDonnell), No. 2:13cv395, 
2014 WL 561978, (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014); appealed to the 
Fourth Circuit but holding that, "Virginia's marriage laws 
unconstitutionally deny Virginia's gay and lesbian citizens the 
fundamental freedom to choose to marry. Marriage is a 
fundamental right under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses, and any limitation on that right is subject to strict 
scrutiny." 
 
11. DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 12–CV–10285, 2014 WL 1100794, (E.D. 
Mich. Mar. 21, 2014); appealed to the Sixth Circuit but holding the 
Michigan Marriage Amendment unconstitutional as not rationally 
related to the governmental interest of child rearing.  Tradition and 
morality are not rationally based. 
 
12. Other due process arguments. 
 
a. "A person who legally marries in her home state, then pulls 
up stakes and moves to another state, acquires a 
significant liberty interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause in the ongoing 
existence of her marriage." Steve Sanders, "The 
Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same Sex Marriage," 
110 Mich. L. Rev. 1421, 1422 (June 2012). 
 
b. Sanders argues that, "This liberty interest creates a right of 
marriage recognition that is conceptually and doctrinally 
distinguishable from any constitutional "right to marry... " It 
is a neutral principle, grounded in core Due Process 
Clause values:  protection of normative expectations about 
marital and family privacy (if a state can't take away your 
child without due process, how can it take away your 
spouse?); respect for established legal and social practices 
(state-to-state marriage recognition is a longstanding 
default rule); and rejection of the idea that a state can 
unilaterally sever a legal family relationship without 
important, proven justifications." Steve Sanders, "Next on 
the Agenda for Marriage Equality Litigators…," SCOTUS 
Blog, (June 26, 2013, 5:40 p.m.) 
http://www.scotusblog.com  
 
c. DOMA, Sanders argues, also implicates "horizontal 
federalism: the obligations states owe one another as 
coequal sovereigns."  Id.  "If it is intolerable to have 'two 
contradictory marriage regimes within the same State,' 
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then why is it more rational to have two contradictory 
marriage regimes in the same country?"  Id. 
 
D. Privileges and Immunities:  The Right to Travel  
  
The Right to Travel "found in the Privileges and Immunities Clause ... is 
'fundamental' and includes the right to 'migrate,' and the State may not 
impose a penalty upon those who exercise [that] right."  Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
 
1. The Right to Travel requires the use of strict scrutiny without the 
need of a suspect class. Any law "serving to penalize the exercise 
of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."  Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
 
2. Tanco v. Haslam, (M.D. Tenn., October 21, 2013):  Four legally 
married same-sex couples have filed suit challenging Tennessee's 
laws that prevent the state from recognizing their marriages and 
treating them the same as all other legally married couples in 
Tennessee. The lawsuit argues that Tennessee's laws prohibiting 
recognition of the couples' marriages violate the federal 
Constitution's guarantees of equal protection and due process and 
the constitutionally protected right to travel between states and to 
move to other states. 
 
VI. ON THE HORIZON IN KENTUCKY: SOME FUTURE CHALLENGES & 
AFTERSHOCKS 
 
A. Pending Kentucky Lawsuits (from Marriage Equality USA at 
http://www.marriageequality.org/lawsuits) 
 
1. Commonwealth v. Bobbie Jo Clary, Jefferson Circuit Court, Case 
No. 11-CR-003329:  Bobbie Jo Clary is charged with murder of a 
neighbor in Louisville, Kentucky. In July 2013, prosecutors wanted 
Geneva Case to testify against her wife, Bobbie Jo Clary, in the 
murder trial.  Prosecutors say Case heard Clary admit to the 
murder. Case invoked Kentucky's martial privilege, KRE 504.  The 
Commonwealth is refusing to recognize Clary's and Case's 2004 
Vermont civil union, which in 2009 could be automatically 
converted to a Vermont marriage (although Clary and Case never 
applied for a marriage license.)  On September 23, 2013, a judge 
ruled that Ms. Case must testify against her own 
spouse, reasoning was that since Clary and Case are in a civil 
union, they are not considered married in Vermont, so even if 
Kentucky's marriage ban were unconstitutional, it would not allow 
the couple to invoke spousal privilege. Nevertheless, the court 
said that it's "abundantly clear" that Kentucky doesn't recognize 
same-sex marriages within the state or from other states. 
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2. Kentucky Equality Federation v. Governor Steve Beshear, et al.: 
On September 10, 2013, a lawsuit was filed in Franklin Circuit 
Court challenging §233A, the 2004 constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex civil marriage. In response, the Attorney 
General's Office said that plaintiffs, Lindsey Bain and Daniel 
Rogers, a married same-sex couple, don't have "standing to 
challenge our state definition of marriage and that their claim does 
not qualify as an 'injury in fact' and so is not ripe for adjudication." 
 
In a joint filing dated September 30, Conway and 
Governor Beshear "deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to the 
requested relief or any other relief whatsoever."  
 
3. Romero v. Romero:  On October 25, 2013, Alysha Romero filed a 
dissolution petition from Rebecca Sue Romero in Jefferson Family 
Court. The Romeros were legally married in Massachusetts in 
2009.  This filing is the state's first dissolution involving a same-
sex couple who were married in another state where same-sex 
marriages are legal, and who want to end their marriage in 
Kentucky.  
 
B. KRS 411.130:  Kentucky's Wrongful Death Statute 
 
§411.130. Action for wrongful death – Personal 
representative to prosecute – Distribution of amount 
recovered.  
 
(1) Whenever the death of a person results from an injury 
inflicted by the negligence or wrongful act of another, 
damages may be recovered for the death from the person 
who caused it, or whose agent or servant caused it. If the 
act was willful or the negligence gross, punitive damages 
may be recovered. The action shall be prosecuted by the 
personal representative of the deceased. 
 
(2) The amount recovered, less funeral expenses and the 
cost of administration and costs of recovery including 
attorney fees, not included in the recovery from the 
defendant, shall be for the benefit of and go to the kindred 
of the deceased in the following order: 
  
(a) If the deceased leaves a widow or husband, 
and no children or their descendants, then the whole to 
the widow or husband. 
 
(b) If the deceased leaves a widow and children or 
a husband and children, then one-half (1/2) to the widow 
or husband and the other one-half (1/2) to the children of 
the deceased. 
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(c) If the deceased leaves a child or children, but 
no widow or husband, then the whole to the child or 
children. 
 
(d) If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or 
child, then the recovery shall pass to the mother and 
father of the deceased, one (1) moiety each, if both are 
living; if the mother is dead and the father is living, the 
whole thereof shall pass to the father; and if the father is 
dead and the mother living, the whole thereof shall go to 
the mother. In the event the deceased was an adopted 
person, "mother" and "father" shall mean the adoptive 
parents of the deceased. 
 
(e) If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or 
child, and if both father and mother are dead, then the 
whole of the recovery shall become a part of the personal 
estate of the deceased, and after the payment of his 
debts the remainder, if any, shall pass to his kindred more 
remote than those above named, according to the law of 
descent and distribution. 
 
 C. KRS 411.145:  Kentucky's Loss of Consortium Statute 
 
(1) As used in this section "consortium" means the right to 
the services, assistance, aid, society, companionship and 
conjugal relationship between husband and wife, or wife 
and husband. 
 
(2) Either a wife or husband may recover damages against 
a third person for loss of consortium, resulting from a 
negligent or wrong. 
 
Martin v. Ohio County Hosp. Corp., 295 S.W.3d 104 (Ky. 2009), holding 
that surviving spouse's loss of consortium damages extend beyond the 
death of the injured. 
 
D. Other Statutory Challenges 
 
Aside from §233A of the Kentucky Constitution, attack KRS 402.045(1) 
and (2).  
 
1. "A marriage between members of the same sex which occurs in 
another jurisdiction shall be void in Kentucky."  KRS 402.045(1). 
 
2. "Any rights granted by virtue of the marriage, or its termination, 
shall be unenforceable in Kentucky courts."  KRS 402.045(2). 
 
3. "Any clerk who knowingly issues a marriage license to any 
persons [same sex couples] prohibited by this chapter from 
marrying shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and removed 
from office by the judgment of the court in which he is convicted.  
KRS 402.990(6). 
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TYING THE KNOT FEDERALLY: WHAT WILL IT MEAN  
FOR KENTUCKY SAME-SEX COUPLES? 
Ross T. Ewing1 
 
 
 
I.  KEY LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS POST-WINDSOR AFFECTING SAME-SEX 
MARRIED COUPLES LIVING IN KENTUCKY, OR OTHER "NON- 
RECOGNITION" (FOR NOW) STATES 
 
A.  Taxes 
 
1. Federal taxes. 
 
The IRS will consider all same-sex married couples as married for 
federal tax purposes, regardless of place of domicile. This 
includes income taxes, gift and estate taxes, personal and 
dependency exemptions where marriage is a factor, earned 
income tax credit, child tax credit, and IRAs.  (Rev. Rul. 2013-17 
dated 8/29/2013, effective 9/16/2013.) 
 
All married couples must file their income tax returns as married 
(married filing jointly, or married filing separately). Total income 
taxes might be higher or lower than when each of the married 
spouses had to file tax returns as "single." 
 
See Instructions for Form 1040X (Rev. December 2013), available 
at www.irs.gov, regarding same-sex married couples: "You may 
amend a return filed before September 16, 2013 to change your 
filing status to married filing separately or married filing jointly.  But 
you are not required to change your filing status on a prior return, 
even if you amend that return for another reason.  In either case, 
your amended return must be consistent with the filing status you 
choose.  You must file the amended return before the expiration of 
the period of limitations." 
 
Refund claims could include: (1) taxes paid by an employee for 
the value of health insurance coverage provided by the employer 
for the employee's spouse, and which was included as part of the 
employee's gross income in one or more prior tax years; (2) taxes 
paid by an employee on premiums that an employee paid with 
after-tax dollars for health insurance coverage for his/her spouse 
(e.g. in a cafeteria plan); and (3) Social Security and Medicare 
taxes paid by the employee on the health insurance benefits for 
his/her spouse.  (See Q & A 10-12 in Answers to FAQs for 
Individuals of the Same Sex Who are Married, issued by the IRS 
1 Adapted, with permission, from "To Marry or Not to Marry" by Arlene Zarembka, Esq. The 
author wishes to thank Ms. Zarembka, Joan Burda, Esq., and the National LGBT Bar Association 
for assistance in compiling the federal materials obtained herein.   
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in conjunction with Rev. Rul. 2013-17.) The IRS has issued 
administrative procedures for adjustments and claims for refunds 
or credits for overpayments of employment taxes attributable to 
same-sex spouse benefits. See IRS Notice 2013-61 dated 
10/28/2013. 
 
2. Kentucky taxes. 
 
The stay in Bourke v. Beshear obviously complicates the filing of 
state returns.  Meanwhile, a suit has been filed in Franklin Circuit 
Court seeking to require the Revenue Cabinet specifically to 
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states. A 
decision in that case is unlikely pending the dissolution of the stay 
in Bourke. 
   
B.  Retirement Plans 
 
1.  Retirement plans subject to ERISA. 
 
ERISA applies to most employer and union sponsored retirement 
plans in private industry.  ERISA does not apply to state and local 
government plans (including plans covering public school teachers 
and school administrators), most church plans, and plans for 
federal government employees. 
 
All retirement plans subject to ERISA must provide the same 
benefits to an employee married to a person of the same sex as 
provided to employees married to opposite-sex spouses, even if 
the employee lives in a non-recognition state.  (U.S. Department 
of Labor, Technical Release #2013-04, dated 9/18/2013).  
However, employers are not required to provide benefits to 
spouses.  Moreover, experts in health insurance law have 
concluded that there currently is no requirement that employers 
subject to ERISA who provide health plan coverage to opposite-
sex spouses of employees must also provide it to same-sex 
spouses in non-recognition states (although they may do so if they 
so choose). 
 
If a married employee under a plan governed by ERISA wants to 
name a beneficiary other than the spouse of his/her retirement 
benefits under a defined benefit plan (and most defined 
contribution plans), the spouse must sign a consent to such an 
election. 
 
A married employee can take a hardship distribution from a 
defined contribution plan to pay medical expenses, tuition, or 
funeral expenses of his/her spouse, even if the spouse has 
consented to the employee naming someone else as the primary 
beneficiary of the plan upon the employee's death. 
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See www.dol.gov/ebsa for more details about retirement plans 
under ERISA. 
 
N.B.: The IRS has announced that it will be issuing a guidance on 
the retroactive application of the Windsor decision for retirement 
plans in the near future, and the Department of Labor plans to 
issue a guidance on the definition of "spouse" in Title 1 of ERISA.  
(Bloomberg BNA Weekly Report, 2/3/2014) Whether or not that 
guidance will address refusal by employers to treat same-sex 
spouses the same as opposite-sex spouses for health plan 
coverage remains to be seen. 
 
2.  Distributions from retirement plans (including IRAs). 
 
A spouse (including a same-sex spouse) who is the beneficiary of 
a retirement account or plan of his/her spouse has more options 
regarding Required Minimum Distributions (RMDs) than a 
beneficiary who is not a spouse. A spouse can: 
 
• Treat the retirement account or plan as her own, or roll-
over to her own IRA; or 
 
• Calculate the RMD based on her own current age; or  
 
• Calculate the RMD based on the deceased spouse's age 
at death; or 
 
• Wait to start taking RMDs until the deceased spouse would 
have reached age 70 ½ . No distributions are required from 
a Roth IRA until the owner's death. 
 
See www.irs.gov/retirement plans for more information regarding 
retirement account distribution rules. 
 
C. Federal Employees 
 
A federal employee married to a person of the same sex (including 
married same-sex employees living in non-recognition states) is entitled 
to many of the same benefits to which employees married to a member of 
the opposite sex are entitled.  This includes naming her spouse as 
beneficiary for spousal survivor benefits.  The children being raised by 
same-sex married couples are entitled to family coverage under the 
federal employee's benefits, even if the federal employee has not legally 
adopted the children. 
 
In addition, same-sex domestic partners, the children of an employee's 
same-sex domestic partner, and some other relatives of the employee's 
same-sex domestic partner have been identified by the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) as "family members" for the purposes of 
sick leave, funeral leave, the Voluntary Leave Transfer (VLTP) Program, 
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the Voluntary Leave Bank (VLBP) Program, and the Emergency Leave 
Transfer (ELT) Program. 
 
See "Frequently Asked Questions-Same Sex Domestic Partner Benefits" 
(which also includes information about same-sex married couples) on 
OPM's website (www.OPM.gov), and the OPM fact sheets listed in that 
FAQ, for more details. 
 
D. Family and Medical Leave Act 
 
Under current regulations, whether a person is a "spouse" under the 
FMLA is based on the place of domicile of the employee.  Therefore, the 
FMLA regulations currently do not require that an employee married to a 
same-sex spouse and living in a non-recognition state be given unpaid 
leave to care for her spouse. However, an employee living in a non-
recognition state who acts "in loco parentis" with regard to the child of her 
spouse or unmarried partner can be entitled to FMLA leave.  (DOL Fact 
Sheet #28, August 2013).  Recent news reports indicate that the DOL 
may be planning to change the regulations to include same-sex spouses 
living in non-recognition states. 
 
E.  Social Security 
 
In determining whether spousal benefits will be paid to the spouse of a 
person who is receiving Social Security benefits (or to the spouse of a 
deceased Social Security recipient), Social Security looks to whether the 
marriage is recognized in the place of domicile of the wage earner (i.e. 
the spouse upon whose earnings a claim for benefits is made) at the time 
of application for benefits.  This is pursuant to the Social Security statute.  
If the marriage is not recognized in the state of domicile of the wage 
earner, then spousal benefits are not paid.  Instead, Social Security is 
holding such applications until a decision is made as to whether or not 
such couples are entitled to spousal benefits. 
 
For marriages that are recognized in the place of domicile, if a wage-
earner is receiving Social Security benefits (whether due to disability or 
retirement), the spouse could be entitled to spousal benefits of up to 50 
percent of the benefit that the retired or disabled wage-earner is receiving 
(and the retired or disabled recipient continues to receive 100 percent of 
his own benefit).  If a deceased wage-earner was receiving Social 
Security benefits prior to death, the surviving spouse could receive 100 
percent of the benefits that the deceased spouse was receiving at time of 
death.  If the surviving spouse is already receiving his own benefits, he 
can decide whether it is more advantageous to continue to receive his 
own benefits or to receive the deceased spouse's benefits.  If there are 
children, they also might be eligible for child benefits. 
 
The federal Social Security statute also allows Social Security to pay 
spousal benefits to a person who would inherit from the worker as a 
spouse would under the laws of intestate succession for personal 
property in the state of domicile.  42 U.S.C §416(h).  Thus, if the couple 
has registered as domestic partners or civil union partners in a state that 
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has a registered domestic partner or civil union statute, the partner of the 
wage earner may be eligible for spousal benefits.  Further guidance may 
be needed from Social Security. 
Even if living in a non-recognition state, filing for spousal benefits 
immediately (if otherwise eligible) is very important, in order to preserve 
the filing date for calculation of back benefits due if Social Security later 
recognizes the same-sex marriage, domestic partnership, or civil union. 
 
See the FAQs at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/same-sexcouples/ for 
more information.  See also the following sections of Social Security's 
Program Operations Manual System (POMS): 
 
• GN 00210.001 Windsor Same-Sex Marriage Claims-Introduction 
 
• GN 00210.005 Holding Claims, Appeals, and Post-Entitlement 
Actions Involving Same-Sex Marriages or Legal Same-Sex 
Relationships other than Marriage 
 
• GN 00210.010 Interviewing Individuals with Claims Involving 
Same-Sex Relationships 
 
• GN 00210.800 Same-Sex Marriages – Supplemental Security 
Income 
 
• GN 00305.005 Determining Marital Status 
 
F. Department of Defense 
 
The DOD considers all married same-sex couples, both uniformed 
service members and DOD civilian employees, to be married for all DOD 
benefits purposes, including those living in non-recognition states.  Same-
sex military spouses have access to all military facilities that are available 
to military spouses.  The DOD also will give "non-chargeable leave" to a 
gay service member serving at a duty station that is more than 100 miles 
from a state that grants same-sex marriages, so that the couple can travel 
to a jurisdiction where they can marry.  (DOD Memorandum dated 
8/13/2013 and DOD News Release #581-13 dated 8/14/2013.) 
 
G. Immigration 
 
An American married to a same-sex spouse should be able, in many 
cases, to sponsor the spouse for a green card or a visa.  Immigration law 
is extremely complex. Anyone married to a non-citizen, or who is 
considering marriage to a non-citizen, must consult with an attorney 
specializing in immigration law to determine whether or not to file an 
application to sponsor a spouse for a green card or visa. 
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H.  Department of Justice 
 
Attorney General Eric Holder has announced that the DOJ will "interpret 
the terms 'spouse,' 'marriage,' 'widow,' 'widower,' 'husband,' 'wife,' and 
any other term related to family or marital status in statutes, regulations, 
and policies administered, enforced, or interpreted by the Department, to 
include married same-sex spouses whenever allowable.  The Department 
will take the same position in litigation, to the extent consistent with the 
lawful statutes, regulations, and policies over which other agencies bear 
primary administrative, enforcement, or interpretive responsibility. The 
Department will recognize all marriages, including same-sex marriages, 
valid in the jurisdiction where the marriage was celebrated to the extent 
consistent with law."  Moreover, the DOJ will not challenge an assertion of 
marital privilege in a civil or criminal case by a party who is married to a 
same-sex spouse, even if the couple is living in a non-recognition state.   
(Memorandum by the Attorney General dated 2/10/14 to all DOJ 
Personnel.) 
 
Likewise, all programs administered under the DOJ (e.g. Public Safety 
Officers' Benefits Program, the September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund, and the Radiation Exposure Compensation Program) will recognize 
same-sex marriages that are valid in the place where they were 
celebrated. The United States Trustee Program will apply the Bankruptcy 
Code and Bankruptcy Rules to same-sex married couples in the same 
manner they are applied to opposite-sex married couples to cover 
individuals lawfully married in any jurisdiction.  The Bureau of Prisons will 
interpret all of its policies that are affected by marital status, such as 
visitation at federal prisons and next-of-kin notification regarding inmates, 
to include all lawful same-sex marriages, regardless of the place of 
domicile.  
 
I.   Divorce  
 
In Kentucky, the availability of divorce is currently being litigated in 
Jefferson Circuit Court in Romero v. Romero, 13-CI-503351.  A decision 
in that case, as with action on almost any issue at the state level, may not 
be forthcoming until the expiration of the stay in Bourke v. Beshear, 
supra.  Other states may be available.  To wit:   
 
Canada, California, Delaware, D.C., Hawaii, Illinois (after 
6/1/2014),* Minnesota, and, in limited circumstances, 
Vermont.  See "Divorce for Same-Sex Couples Who Live 
in Non-Recognition States: A Guide for Attorneys" at 
www.nclrights.org (Dec. 2013). 
 
N.B.: Illinois law prohibits marriage by non-residents if the 
marriage would be void if contracted in the jurisdiction 
where the couple lives.  750 ILCS 5/217 (in Ch. 40., par 
217). New Hampshire law does  as well. 
 
With the possibility of divorce, consider also the possibility of a prenuptial 
agreement.  In Kentucky, the consideration for a valid prenuptial agree-
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ment is the marriage itself.  Settles v. Settles, 114 S.W. 303 (Ky. 1908).  If 
the ruling in Bourke v. Beshear is properly enforced, then a legal same-
sex marriage entered into in a foreign jurisdiction is a "marriage" under 
Kentucky law and thus valid consideration for a prenuptial agreement.  
Query: does it have to be so at the time of solemnization?  Do rules of 
contract interpretation permit the validation of consideration after the 
execution of the contract?   
 
J. Additional Resources 
 
1. Whether to Wed: A Legal and Tax Guide for Gay and Lesbian 
Couples, by Scott E. Squillace, available for purchase at 
http://whether-to-wed.com//. 
 
2. Sexual Orientation & the Law (2013-2014 edition), Karen 
Moulding, Ed. (Thomson Reuters, aka West.) 
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SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS FOR 
SAME-SEX COUPLES AFTER WINDSOR 
Kathryn L. Moore 
 
 
 
I. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
 
The American Social Security system covers about 96 percent of the American 
workforce.  It pays two basic types of benefits to workers:  (1) old-age (that is, 
retirement) benefits1 and (2) disability benefits.2  In addition, it provides "auxiliary" 
or "derivative" benefits to certain family members of retired, disabled, and 
deceased workers.  Family member beneficiaries fall into four basic categories:  
(1) the spouses of retired or disabled workers;3 (2) the surviving spouses of 
deceased workers;4 (3) the dependent children of retired, disabled, or deceased 
workers;5 and (4) the dependent parents of deceased workers.6  
 
On August 9, 2013, the Social Security Administration announced that it had 
begun to process some retirement spouse claims for same-sex couples and 
paying benefits when due.7 On December 16, 2013, the Social Security 
Administration announced that it had begun to process some surviving spouse 
benefits for surviving members of same-sex marriages and paying benefits when 
due.8  In addition, it has said that it is working with the Justice Department to 
develop policies on the payment of spouse and surviving spouse benefits for 
same-sex couples who live in a state that does not recognize same-sex 
1 42 U.S.C. §402(a). 
 
2 42 U.S.C. §423(a). 
 
3 42 U.S.C. §402(b) & (c). 
 
4 42 U.S.C. §402(e) & (f). 
 
5 42 U.S.C. §402(d). 
 
6 42 U.S.C. §402(g). 
 
7 Social Security, News Release, Statement of Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social 
Secuity on Payments to Same-Sex Couples (Aug. 9, 2013), available at 
http://socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/pr/doma-statement-pr.html.   
 
8 Social Security, News Release, Statement of Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social 
Secuity on New Payments to Same-Sex Married Couples (Dec. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/pr/doma-new-payments-pr.html.   
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marriage.9  It encourages individuals who may be eligible for such benefits to 
apply now to protect against the potential loss of any benefits.10 
 
A Calculating Social Security Benefits 
 
Both worker benefits and family member benefits are based on the 
worker's earnings record. Accordingly, this section will first provide a 
basic overview of how workers' benefits are calculated.  It will then 
describe how spouse and surviving spouse benefits are calculated.   
 
1. Workers' benefits. 
 
Workers' old-age benefits are based on thirty-five years of 
earnings, which are indexed for inflation.11 Average adjusted 
earnings, or "average indexed monthly earnings" ("AIME"), are 
calculated by taking the best thirty-five years of earnings adjusted 
for past wage inflation, adding them together and dividing by 420 
(the number of months in thirty-five years). Average adjusted 
earnings are then multiplied by a progressive benefit formula to 
determine the "primary insurance amount" (PIA), or how much of 
the average adjusted earnings should be replaced.12  The formula 
replaces a higher percentage of adjusted average earnings the 
lower one's average earnings so that the ratio of benefits to 
average earnings is higher for those with low average earnings 
than for those with high average earnings.  For those reaching 
age sixty-two in 2014, the formula replaces 90 percent of the first 
$816 of AIME, plus 32 percent of AIME between $816 and $4,917, 
plus 15 percent of AIME above $4,917, up to the Social Security 
maximum benefit.13  Disability benefits are calculated in a similar 
manner, but fewer than thirty-five years may be taken into account 
in determining the PIA for a disabled worker.14  
9 Social Security Administration, Frequently Asked Questions, "Do I qualify for benefits if I live in 
pace that prohibits or does not recognize same sex marriage or other legal same sex 
relationships?", available at https://faq.ssa.gov/link/portal/34011/34019/Article/3547/Do-I-qualify-
for-benefits-if-I-live-in-a-place-that-prohibits-or-does-not-recognize-same-sex-marriages-or-other-
legal-same-sex-relationships.   
 
10 Id.  
 
11 42 U.S.C. §415(b).  To index earnings, "each year's wage is multiplied by an 'indexing factor,' 
which equals the ratio of the average national wage in the year the worker turns sixty to the 
average national wage in the year to be indexed.  For administrative convenience, wages earned 
at age sixty or later are left at their nominal value in the indexing process."  C. Eugene Steuerle & 
Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century: Right and Wrong Approaches to 
Reform 76 (1994).   
 
12 42 U.S.C. §415(a).   
 
13 In 2013, the maximum Social Security benefit for a worker retiring at the full retirement age is 
$2,533 per month or $30,396. 
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Under current law, a worker15 is entitled to receive "full benefits," 
that is, benefits equal to her PIA, at "Full Retirement Age."16  The 
full retirement age is currently age sixty-six for individuals who 
reach sixty-two in 2005 or later.17 Beginning in 2017, it is 
scheduled to increase gradually to age sixty-seven by the year 
2022.18  A worker may elect to receive actuarially reduced benefits 
as early as age sixty-two.19  Similarly, a worker may elect to delay 
the receipt of benefits beyond age sixty-five and receive an 
actuarially increased benefit.20 A "totally disabled"21 worker22 is 
also entitled to receive benefits equal to her PIA.23 
 
2. Spouse benefits. 
 
Upon reaching full retirement age, the spouse of a retired or 
disabled worker is entitled to receive a spouse benefit equal to 50 
percent of the worker's PIA.24  The spouse may elect to receive a 
reduced benefit as early as age sixty-two.25  Spouses who are 
entitled to receive benefits based upon their own earnings record 
as well as their spouse's earnings record may only receive a total 
14 For disabled workers, the PIA is calculated as though the worker had attained age sixty-two at 
the time of disablement.  42 U.S.C. §423(a)(2).   
 
15 In order to be eligible for old-age benefits, a worker must be "fully insured”; that is, the worker 
must have worked in covered employment for a long enough period of time. 42 U.S.C. 
§§402(a)(1) & 414.   
 
16 42 U.S.C. §402(a). 
 
17 42 U.S.C. §416(l). 
 
18 42 U.S.C. §416(l).  The full retirement age was sixty-five for individuals who reached sixty-two 
before 2000.  It gradually increased from sixty-five to sixty-six for individuals who reached sixty-
two between 2000 and 2005.  Id. 
 
19 42 U.S.C. §402(q)(1) & (9).  If a worker with a full retirement age of sixty-six elects to begin 
receiving benefits at age sixty-two, the worker's benefit will be equal to 75 percent of the benefit 
the worker would have been entitled to had the worker waited until the full retirement age to retire.   
 
20 42 U.S.C. §402(w).  For all workers born after 1942, the delayed retirement credit is 8 percent 
per year until age seventy.   
 
21  42 U.S.C. §423(a)(1)(D) & (d).  
 
22 In order to be eligible for old-age benefits, a totally disabled worker must be "fully insured" and 
"disability insured"; that is, the worker must have worked in covered employment long enough 
and recently enough.  42 U.S.C. §423(a)(1)(A) & (c).  
 
23 42 U.S.C. §423(a). 
 
24 42 U.S.C. §402(b)(2). 
 
25 The spousal benefit is reduced by a greater percentage than the reduction applied to retired 
worker's benefits.   
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benefit equal to the larger of the two benefits.26 Thus, those 
spouses whose worker's benefit exceeds their spouse benefit are 
only entitled to receive their own worker's benefit. In contrast, 
"dually entitled" beneficiaries, that is, spouses whose spouse 
benefit exceeds their worker's benefit, are only entitled to a total 
benefit equal to their spouse benefit.  
 
3. Surviving spouse benefits.  
 
The surviving spouse of an insured worker is entitled to receive a 
surviving spouse benefit equal to 100 percent of the deceased 
worker's PIA if the surviving spouse has reached full retirement 
age.27 Surviving spouses as young as age sixty may elect to 
receive a reduced benefit.28 Again, working spouses are only 
entitled to receive a total benefit equal to the larger of their own 
worker's benefit or their surviving spouse benefit.29   
 
B Maximizing Social Security Benefits   
 
Prior to reaching the full retirement age, a married individual who files for 
benefits is subject to a "deemed filing" provision.  Under the "deemed 
filing provision," the individual is assumed to be filing for both the 
individual's worker's benefit (based on the individual's own earnings 
record) and the individual's spouse benefit (based on a percentage of his 
or her spouse's earnings record). The Social Security Administration 
compares the two benefits and awards the higher of the two benefits. 30   
 
Once an individual reaches full retirement age, deemed filing no longer 
applies and an individual may elect whether to receive the individual's 
own worker's benefit or a spouse benefit.  Thus, married individuals can 
elect to receive a spouse benefit at age sixty-six and later switch to their 
own retired worker's benefit. This provides married couples with some 
planning opportunities to coordinate spouse and surviving spouse 
benefits and maximize their total benefits as a couple.31   
26 42 U.S.C. §402(k)(3)(A).   
 
27 42 U.S.C. §§402(e)(2)(A) & (f)(2)(A).   
 
28  42 U.S.C. §§402(q)(1).   
 
29 42 U.S.C. §402(k)(3)(B).   
 
30 Alicia H. Munnell, et al., Strange But True: Claim Social Security Now, Claim More Later, 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Brief No. 9-9 (April 2009).   
 
31 For a discussion of the various claiming strategies and opportunities to maximize benefits, see 
Francine J. Lipman, and James E. Williamson, "Social Security Benefits Formula 101: A Practical 
Primer," ABA Section of Taxation Newsquarterly 14 (Summer 2010);  Francine J. Lipman, and 
James E. Williamson, "Social Security Spouse and Survivor Benefits 101:  Practical Primer Part II 
(Or Another Reason to Put a Ring on It),"  ABA Section of Taxation Newsquarterly 10 (Fall 2010); 
Alicia H. Munnell, et al., Strange But True: Claim Social Security Now, Claim More Later, Center 
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There are two principal maximizing strategies: (1) file and suspend, and 
(2) claim now, claim more later. 
 
1. File and suspend.  
 
Under this scenario, the higher income earning spouse files for his 
or her Social Security benefit at full retirement age so that the 
lower income earning spouse can start receiving a spouse benefit.  
The higher earning spouse suspends his or her benefit to start 
earning the delayed retirement credits until age seventy.  At that 
time, the higher earning spouse would begin to collect his or her 
own higher benefit. 
 
2. Claim now, claim more later. 
 
Under this scenario, the lower earning spouse applies for his or 
her benefits at full retirement age. The higher earning spouse then 
applies for a spouse benefit at his or her full retirement age and 
delays applying for his or her own benefit until the higher earning 
spouse reaches age seventy.  At age seventy, the higher earning 
spouse would then switch over to his or her own higher benefit.   
 
As rule of thumb, it is generally a good idea for the highest income 
earner in the marriage to delay receipt of Social Security benefits 
until age seventy because this will give couple the highest income 
while they're both alive and the highest death benefit when one 
passes away.   
 
II. OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
 
While Social Security benefits are mandatory for most employers, many 
employers also offer additional employee benefits, such as 401(k) plans.  The 
provision of such benefits is purely voluntary; no federal law requires that 
employers offer such benefits.   If, however, an employer elects to offer voluntary 
employee benefit plans, the plans are generally32 regulated by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).33 In addition, in order to 
receive favorable income tax treatment, such plans must satisfy requirements set 
forth in the Internal Revenue Code.34 
for Retirement Research at Boston College Brief No. 9-9 (April 2009); Alicia H. Munnell et al., 
Strange But True: Claim and Suspend Social Security, Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College Brief No. 9-11 (May 2009); Steven A. Sass, When Should Married Men Claim Social 
Security Benefits?, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Brief No. 8-4 (March 
2008).   
 
32 ERISA only applies to private-sector employee benefit plans; it does not apply to governmental 
plans.  ERISA §4(b), 29 U.S.C. §1003(b).   
 
33 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).   
 
34 See, e.g. IRC §401(a) (setting forth qualification requirements for most employer-sponsored 
retirement plans).   
29 
                                                                                                                                            
In Rev. Rul. 2013-17, the Internal Revenue Service announced that effective 
September 16, 2013, same-sex couples married in a state or foreign jurisdiction 
that recognizes same-sex marriage will be treated as married for federal tax and 
qualified retirement plan purposes. In Technical Release 2013-04, the 
Department of Labor, which regulates many of ERISA's requirements, similarly 
adopted the "state of celebration" rule for employee benefit plan purposes.  Thus, 
for employee benefit plan purposes, the state where the marriage takes place 
(that is, the state of celebration), and not the state of residence, determines if a 
same-sex couple is entitled to spousal rights and obligations.  
 
Neither ERISA nor the Internal Revenue Code require that plans define the term 
"spouse." Moreover, many plans do not define the term.  If, however, a plan does 
define the term spouse, the plan may not define the term to exclude same-sex 
spouses who were legally married in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex 
marriages. In addition, in operating plans, all plan sponsors and plan 
administrators must ensure that spousal rights,35 such as qualified joint and 
survivor annuities (QJSAs),36 qualified preretirement survivor annuities 
(QPSAs),37 qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs),38 hardship 
distributions,39 and required minimum distribution relief40 extend to same-sex 
spouses.41   
 
 
 
 
 
35 For a more detailed discussion of the effect of Windsor on employee benefit plans, see Laura 
Pergine and Janet Luxton, "The DOMA Decision and Retirement Plans," Vanguard Strategic 
Retirement Consulting Brief (Nov. 2013); Elizabeth Thomas Dold and David N. Levine, "A Look at 
How the Supreme Court's DOMA Decision Impacts Employee Benefit Plans," Taxes – The 
Magazine 13 (Sept. 2013). 
 
36 See ERISA 205(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1055(a)(1); IRC §401(a)(11)(A)(i). 
 
37 See ERISA 205(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1055(a)(2); IRC §401(a)(11)(A)(ii) 
 
38 See ERISA 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1056(d)(3); IRC §401(a)(13)(B). 
 
39 See Treas. Reg. §1.401(k)-1(d)(3)(iii)(B)(3)&(5) (permitting plan to authorize hardship 
withdrawal for medical, tuition, and funeral expenses of spouse). 
 
40 See IRC §401(a)(9)(B)(iv). 
 
41 For additional guidance on the rules applicable to cafeteria plans, flexible spending 
arrangements (FSAs), and health savings accounts (HSAs), see IRS Notice 2014-01. 
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